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Abstract
Corporate governance research indicates that corporate boards of directors may be overly beholden to
management, which can be detrimental to firm value creation. Drawing upon agency theory and the governance law literature, we examine the effects of a new SEC rule designed to lessen managerial power by increasing large, long-term shareholders’ influence in the director nomination process. We predict and find
support for a positive overall market reaction to the rule’s announcement as well as a greater reaction for
firms with characteristics that suggest compromised board independence or greater CEO control. Moreover, we examine the implications of greater shareholder voice for another key stakeholder group, firm
bondholders, and find evidence that it is also value increasing. We conclude by discussing important implications for theory and practice.
Keywords: agency theory, board of directors, proxy, regulation, corporate governance

Introduction
Corporate governance occupies a central role in
many academic disciplines. Management, accounting, economics, finance, and legal scholars, among
others, examine the relationships between parties of
interest to corporations, such as managers, owners,
and creditors. To date, these collective efforts have
concentrated around agency theory (Dalton et al.,
2007), which emphasizes the potential costs arising
from the separation of management and ownership
in public corporations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the empirical evidence

related to agency theory and the efficacy of the specific alignment or policing mechanisms aimed at
mitigating agency costs—the residual loss of firm
value as a result of managerial opportunism—
is weak (see Dalton et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2007).
Thus the debate related to our understanding and
conceptualization of the agency problem and related
policy mechanisms grows. In fact, the debate among
legal scholars, which pits two different conceptualizations of corporate governance against one another (Lan and Heracleous, 2010), has more recently
grown heated (see Bebchuk, 2007; Stout, 2007, 2008;
Strine, 2006).
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The theoretical foundations of this debate relate to
the primacy of the various stakeholders in the corporation and the resulting role of the board of directors.
In accordance with the traditional governance model,
the so-called shareholder primacy model reasserts
that shareholders are the legal owners of the firm in
that they hold the rights to any residual value, and
thus hold primacy over any other stakeholder in the
corporation (Bebchuk, 2005; 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989).
In this view, the role of the board of directors is to
represent the interests of the owners and steer management into making decisions in the best interests of
the shareholders, to whom they have fiduciary duty
(Hart, 1993). As such, Bebchuk (2006) argues that
shareholders must wield strong influence over directors, including their nomination and appointment to
the board. The alternative model, dubbed the stakeholder or director primacy model (e.g., Bainbridge,
2003; Blair and Stout, 2001; Strine, 2006), asserts that
all stakeholders (i.e., management, shareholders,
creditors, employees, customers, etc.) join in team
production; thus, the objective of the corporation is
to maximize the “risk-adjusted returns” to all participants (Lan and Heracleous, 2010: 298). In this view,
the board is viewed as a legally independent entity,
which mediates the interests of all stakeholders (Blair
and Stout, 2001). These two perspectives differ in
several respects, yet they share a common interest:
value creation. While the shareholder primacy view
promotes value creation for the shareholder, the director primacy model argues for value creation for
the corporation as a whole. However, we argue that
neither approach will reach its goal if top management, arguably the most powerful of all stakeholder
groups, is not adequately controlled. Evidence suggests that all other stakeholders are at a great disadvantage vis-à-vis management because of the board
nomination process. Prior research suggests that the
nomination (and thus election) of directors to the
board is largely influenced by the firm’s executives
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995), and existing board members have limited influence on the selection of future
nominees (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). While recent
regulatory changes now require nomination committees to be composed entirely of independent directors, the nomination of new directors is still susceptible to management’s influence (see Worthen, 2011,
for a recent example). Shareholders merely vote be-

tween different nominees, while any more aggressive action is quite difficult and costly (e.g., a proxy
fight). Even further removed, other stakeholders
simply have no voice in director nomination or election. As a result, nominated directors “run unopposed and their election is thus guaranteed” (Bebchuk, 2003: 44). In fact, Westphal and Zajac (1995: 60)
argue that “[w]hile a variety of factors may facilitate
management control over the board, the chief executive officer’s (CEO’s) dominance over the director selection process has often been considered a primary
source of management control.” As such, we propose
that nonmanagement stakeholders suffer when the
board fails to control management and, conversely,
can benefit when the board nomination process allows more direct involvement of one key stakeholder
group—the firm’s shareholders.
As the debate among legal scholars has increased,
more stringent regulatory policy has begun to take
shape. On the heels of the recent near collapse of the
financial sector, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took several decisive steps to redress public concerns over the vigilance and loyalties of directors. While the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX) increased the independence of directors,
the primary means by which shareholders can counter the top managements’ influence over board composition, proxy access, was not addressed by SOX.
To remedy this, on 25 August 2010 the SEC passed
a new proxy access rule, aiming to allow large, longterm shareholders—who own at least three percent of
the firm’s stock continuously for three years—to directly nominate potential directors, thereby providing shareholders greater influence in the nomination
process and over the composition of the board.
Taking the rule’s passage as an exogenous shock
and using this setting as a natural experiment
(Meyer, 1995), we investigate the stock market’s reaction to this increase in shareholder influence. Beyond documenting the market’s positive response to
this event, we develop a theoretical model explaining why the market’s reaction varies based on the
firm’s governance traits. Specifically, we draw upon
agency theory to predict that the market’s reaction
will be contingent on the firm’s board characteristics
and the degree of managerial control. We find strong
empirical support for our framework. Moreover, we
investigate whether greater shareholder power over
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director nomination is viewed positively by another
important group of firm stakeholders—its creditors.
If providing influence to shareholders is part of a zerosum game and other stakeholder groups are likely
to be hurt by greater shareholder control over the
board, bondholders would react negatively. Contrary to this position, though, we predict and show
that bondholders react positively to this change; as
such, it appears that decreasing the power of management to co-opt the board benefits both shareholders and creditors.
In total, this research offers several contributions.
First, we integrate the growing debate in legal studies with management’s treatment of corporate governance. Beyond the approach of Lan and Heracleous (2010), who pertinently describe the director
primacy model, our approach offers a more balanced treatment of this debate and provides data focused on proxy access as it pertains to board nominations. Second, this study contributes to the debate
in law by showing that governance regulations that
enhance shareholder voice are in fact value enhancing, as they help overcome managerial power. Specifically, we see that benefits to other stakeholders (i.e., creditors) accrue when shareholders gain
greater control of director nominations, suggesting that this control increases “the size of the pie
for all,” rather than benefiting one nonmanagement
stakeholder group at the expense of another. Third,
our study offers important implications for agency
theory. While the theory’s empirical record has been
questioned in recent years, we demonstrate that the
theory continues to have predictive power. When
shareholders gain greater influence in the nomination of directors, thereby limiting top management’s
influence over the board, additional value is created,
and shareholder influence in nomination is most
valuable when effective governance is challenged.
Thus our work adds support to agency theory. Next,
this work contributes important insights to the long
stream of agency theory work on the shareholderbondholder conflict (e.g., Black and Cox, 1976; Fama
and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Finally, our theory and results provide insights that
may aid policy makers in helping to determine the
appropriate approach to governance regulations, especially as they relate to proxy access.
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Theory and hypotheses
The role of the board, governance oversight, and
board accountability
The agency problem arises when an organization’s
ownership and management are separated. The goals
and desires of owners and managers conflict, and
shareholders cannot effectively monitor managerial
work (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen and Meckling (1976)
provide a formal derivation of agency costs, which
include the monitoring and alignment expenditures
borne by the owner/principal, as well as the residual
loss to firm value that results from the agency conflict. Corporate governance scholars have since focused on investigating a number of alignment and
policing mechanisms aimed at reducing this residual loss to firm value. The three primary mechanisms
are: 1) the external market for corporate control, 2) incentive alignment through executive compensation,
and 3) monitoring by an independent board of directors (Dalton et al., 2007). Herein, we focus on the third
mechanism— board monitoring.
According to the shareholder primacy model of
corporate governance, boards of directors have a fiduciary responsibility to the firm’s shareholders and
are thus charged with protecting and promoting
shareholder interests. In order to better support this
mandate, SOX increased the independence of corporate boards. As such, boards are now largely outsider-dominated, which—in theory—should make
them independent of management and thus more
vigilant monitors for shareholders.
However, more recent research suggests that independence alone does not dictate a board’s effectiveness at monitoring (Tuggle et al., 2010a). And, as Bebchuk (2003: 44) argues, “(a)lthough shareholder power
to replace directors is supposed to be an important element of our corporate governance system, it is largely
a myth.” Thus, some corporate law scholars argue that
the next step in solving the problem of ineffective monitoring is greater shareholder voice in firm governance.
One side of the debate—aligned with the shareholder
primacy view of governance—argues that increasing
the power and voice of shareholders in the matters of
governance, including shareholder access to the proxy
ballot (e.g., Bebchuk, 2003; 2005; 2006), would lead to
long-term value maximization. It therefore argues that
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shareholder voice-enhancing regulation adds value
to the firm. The opposite side of the debate—aligned
with the director primacy view of governance—advocates that shareholders in general lack both the information and the proper incentives to make the most optimal decisions for the firm (Bainbridge, 2006; Strine,
2006); as such, broad attempts at regulating governance via increased shareholder power are value destroying. However, as Bhagat and Romano note,
“the goal of corporate law is to increase shareholder
wealth;” thus the disagreements among legal scholars are not focused on the end but “over the means to
achieve that end” (2002b: 380). In other words, what
these two views share is the desire for value creation
(Bratton and Wachter, 2008) supported by vigilant
and effective boards. In reality, however, evidence of
poor board monitoring abounds (Dalton et al., 2007).
While extant research shows that directors are subject
to various sociopolitical influences, such as social distancing (Westphal and Khanna, 2003), director ingratiation (Westphal and Stern, 2007), and friendship ties
between directors and the CEO (Westphal, 1999)—all
of which can undermine the independent stance of
the board—it is likely that the initial nomination process compromises a director’s independence from the
outset, as the nomination of a potential director to the
board can be strongly influenced by top management,
and especially by the CEO (Chidambaran, Liu, and
Prabhala, 2010).
Indeed, extant research suggests that the firm’s top
management plays a major role in determining the
composition of the board (e.g., Lorsch and Maclver,
1989; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Wade, O’Reilly,
and Chandratat, 1990; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). As
such, the stance of the board as either a shareholder
advocate or an arbiter of all stakeholder interests is
compromised, as directors may be prone to pursuing
their own best interests (Certo et al., 2008), which are
often tied to those of the CEO and other top managers
due to the nomination system (Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). Although in the post-SOX era nominating committees must be composed of independent
directors, if “a group of current independent directors who are excessively amenable to management’s
wishes are on the nominating committee, and if they
informally consult with and accede to the chief executive’s preference about possible candidates, they may

continue to nominate like-minded directors” (Clark,
2005: 268–269). In practice then, foregoing a costly
proxy fight, shareholders have little choice but to vote
for the proposed slate of directors.1 Placed in an even
weaker position, the firm’s other stakeholders have no
influence over the director nomination or voting process. As such, despite the legislative efforts to increase
director independence, the struggle of stakeholders to
create greater separation between the board and the
firm’s management is still limited by the nomination
and renomination processes.
We contribute to the conversation on the role of
law in corporate governance and extend agency theory by investigating the market’s reaction to a new
rule designed to increase large, long-term shareholders’ influence in director selection. Specifically, we examine whether greater ability of some shareholders
to nominate potential board members is important to
firm value, explicate what firm characteristics suggest
greater potential for additional value creation, and investigate whether granting such shareholders more
influence over board nomination is value enhancing
to another key group with a legal stake in the corporation— the firm’s bondholders.
The empirical context
Because our study utilizes a natural experiment, it
helps to summarize the context and the events leading
up to the rule’s passage. The SEC’s 25 August 2010
adoption of a new proxy access rule is directly related
to the recent U.S. financial crisis, which is commonly
viewed as the result of a systemic failure of current
governance systems. In 2006, a shareholder of the insurance giant American International Group (AIG)
submitted a shareholder proposal to amend AIG’s
corporate bylaws so that a three percent shareholder
could place a nominee in AIG’s annual proxy materials. AIG contested this proposal in federal court arguing that corporations have traditionally been allowed
to exclude proposals of this kind. The U.S. Federal
Court of Appeals based in New York City, however,
overruled AIG’s objections, and thus opened up the
possibility that broader director election proxy access
could proceed on a case-by-case or company-by-company basis (AFSCME v. AIG, 2006).2 Moreover, there
also existed the possibility that individual states could

1. Bebchuk (2007) discusses in detail the dismal statistics regarding challenging the proposed slate of directors, including the relatively low number of challenges and the low chances of winning a proxy fight. One of the greatest impediments to proposing
and electing an alternative slate of directors is very high costs to shareholders.
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selectively alter proxy access rules for corporations
subject to their state corporate codes.3
Fearful that this important issue would be addressed on a piecemeal and/or regional basis, Congress explicitly gave the SEC the power and authority to promulgate national rules on this subject in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was first introduced in the House
in December 2009 and enacted in July 2010 (DoddFrank Act, section 971, 2010).4 According to the SEC,
the agency took decisive action because of severe concerns expressed by many shareholders about board accountability and responsiveness to shareholder interests (SEC, 2010). The regulators were also concerned
about the extent to which public trust was damaged
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. More pointedly,
the SEC questioned “whether boards were exercising
appropriate oversight of management” (SEC, 2010:
7); thus, it appears that the SEC acknowledged that if
boards were to become true champions of shareholder
and other stakeholder interests, the current corporate
governance system needed further revision.
The SEC also recognized that “[a] principal way
that shareholders can hold boards accountable and
influence matters of corporate policy is through the
nomination and election of directors” (SEC, 2010: 8;
emphasis added). Taking into account the authority given to it by Congress, the SEC actively solicited public comments on proposed amendments designed to address this issue. Based on this feedback,
the SEC ultimately voted to adopt proxy access rules
that would allow three percent shareholders who
have held their shares at least three years to nominate their own candidates for the board of directors
(SEC, 2010). The passage of this rule represented an
exogenous event, as the SEC did not approve nor
announce the final rule until 25 August 2010. Moreover, the final vote in favor of the new rule was very
close, 3–2, attesting to the lack of certainty surrounding this event before the announcement.
Next, we discuss our theoretical predictions regarding the impact of this ruling on shareholder
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value. In general, we expect the rule to have the most
positive effect on shareholder value in firms with the
following attributes: ownership structures that will
allow multiple shareholders to benefit from proxy access, boards that are currently aligned with managers, and characteristics that imply a high degree of
managerial control.
Director nomination and shareholder influence
Agency theory is fundamentally a theory about
power and influence, and in order to understand corporate strategic leadership, it is important to identify the distribution of power and influence between
corporate boards and CEOs (Finkelstein, Hambrick,
and Cannella, 2009). The relationship between shareholders and the boards of directors is even more complex than often suggested by agency theory due to
the CEO’s influence over the director nomination
process and the resulting loyalty dynamics between
the board and the CEO. In theory, shareholders elect
board members to represent the shareholders’ interests. Board members then hire a CEO to lead and
manage the firm under continuous and effective
monitoring by the board. However, with the traditional nomination and renomination process in place,
directors can be co-opted by the CEO, which compromises their ability to monitor effectively. Research
shows that CEOs are prone to influence the election
of directors who are sympathetic to their wishes and
to whom they have other (e.g., social or familial) ties
(Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Wade et al., 1990).
Moreover, the current system of director nomination allows CEOs to compromise the integrity of directors’ allegiances, even those who are not initially
sympathetic to management. Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) proposes that individuals feel obligated to repay the benefits they receive from others in the course of their relationship.
Those who fail to provide a benefit in return may
fall victim to various social sanctions, distrust, denial of future benefits, as well as decreased reputa-

2. AFSCME v. AIG. 462 F. 3D 121 (2nd Cir. 2006).
3. In 2009, the state of Delaware (where most firms are incorporated) passed an amendment to current law that allowed corporations to voluntarily permit shareholder proxy access, thereby ratifying the status quo. Shortly thereafter, the Delaware Bar Association communicated to the SEC that because of the new law, all action to introduce proxy access regulation at the federal level
should be halted. Nevertheless, in May 2009, the SEC announced a draft of a new proposed national rule, which would allow
shareholders to nominate their own director-candidates if they held one, three, or five percent of the firm’s shares—depending
on the size of a company—for at least one year.
4. The Act did not in any way require the SEC to adopt new rules or regulations permitting shareholder proxy access to nominate
directors; it did, however, clearly and directly place the issue in the SEC’s jurisdiction.

1436

C a m p b e l l e t a l . i n St rat eg i c M a n ag e m e n t J o u r n a l 3 3 ( 2 0 1 2 )

tion (Gouldner, 1960). Thus, once an individual receives critical resources from another, he or she will
attempt to reciprocate, resulting in a quid pro quo relationship. Because directors largely owe their positions to the top management, especially the CEO, it
is likely that such social exchange relationships exist
between directors and the managers whom they are
supposed to monitor. As board appointment leads
to greater status within the corporate elite, a director
likely feels obligated to reciprocate for the directorship opportunity, which may result in showing executives more considerate treatment. Shareholders,
then, may often be engaged in a “tug-of-war” with
the CEO for the loyalty of directors. Historically, the
CEO has wielded the power to most strongly influence this struggle.
However, allowing shareholders to directly nominate director candidates provides an important tool
in fighting cronyism between the CEO and the board
(Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Not only is the shareholder-nominated candidate not ingratiated to the
CEO, she/he is unlikely to be sympathetic to management’s agenda unless that agenda is aligned with
shareholder interests. Providing more power and influence to the owners of the firm to nominate corporate directors helps enact relationships that better serve owners’ interests, reducing agency costs,
and leading to more effective governance, which enhances value creation. Thus, we predict that greater
influence over the process of new director nomination via proxy access will elicit a positive response
from the market. We also expect that the change in
shareholder value will be especially pronounced for
firms where multiple owners are able to benefit from
this enhanced sphere of influence—that is, where a
greater number of shareholders meet the two requirements for proxy access (3% ownership and three-year
holding period).5 Therefore:
Hypothesis 1a: Granting owners greater influence
in the process of director nomination will elicit a
positive market reaction.
Hypothesis 1b: As the number of owners receiving
greater influence in the process of director nomi-

nation increases, the greater the change in shareholder value in reaction to the new rule.

Board characteristics and value creation
One of the firm characteristics indicative of lower
shareholder rights and weak governance is the firm’s
use of a classified (“staggered”) board structure. A
classified board provision usually only allows onethird of the board to be elected each year for a threeyear term. This is an important “delay” provision in
the event of a corporate takeover (Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick, 2003), and, as such, limits the effectiveness of
the market for corporate control. In fact, a number of
firms turned to this provision in the 1980s during the
wave of corporate takeovers; since then, the adoption
of this provision has been widely criticized by shareholders, who view it as a mechanism for director and
management entrenchment (Sundaramurthy, Rechner, and Wang, 1996). Studies show that the adoption of classified board amendments has a significant
negative effect on stock prices and suggest that this
provision increases the bargaining power of management to the detriment of shareholder wealth (Pound,
1987). A recent study provides further evidence implying “that staggered boards at least partly cause,
and not merely reflect, a lower firm value” (Bebchuk
and Cohen, 2005: 411).
The presence of a classified board serves as a negative signal of the firm’s governance quality; because of this, firms with classified boards have often
been featured on the CalPERS’ “Reform Focus List”
of companies targeted for poor governance practices. Sundaramurthy et al. (1996) found that institutional ownership significantly reduces the likelihood
of adoption of a classified board, suggesting that major shareholders are opposed to this practice. In fact,
despite increasing numbers of advisory shareholder
resolutions recommending the dismantling of existing staggered boards, boards overwhelmingly choose
not to implement these majority-passed resolutions
(Bebchuk, 2005). As such, viewing board structure
through the lens of agency theory as the outcome of a

5. We thank a thoughtful reviewer for pointing out that ownership concentration may make the firm easier to monitor. However, including a measure of, for example, percentage of firm shares held by institutions (as a proxy for ownership concentration) would mask the effect of how many owners would be eligible to gain proxy access and thus benefit from the new rule.
Moreover, if concentrated ownership per se indeed makes the firm easier to monitor, making the impact of the rule smaller,
we would expect the opposite finding—a greater number of three percent owners leading to lower (less positive) change in
shareholder value.
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bargaining process between shareholders, managers,
and the board, firms with a staggered board structure
reflect the primacy of managerial interests over the
owners’ interest. Such structures suggest higher director entrenchment and greater loyalty of directors
toward management rather than shareholders. Therefore, we expect that granting owners greater influence over the process of director nomination will be
received even more positively if the firm has a classified board structure, as the rule is expected to bring
more salutary changes in firms with entrenched directors and/or managers. Formally:
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a classified or “staggered” board will be positively related to the
change in shareholder value in reaction to the new
rule.

Another important factor affecting the strength
of board monitoring is the composition of the board
in terms of the affiliation of each director. Although
“[b]oard composition has been recognized as one
of the most significant board dimensions for some
time,” (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 231), the majority of
extant research has adopted a simplified categorization of “insider” (i.e., employee of the firm) and
“outsider” directors (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Outside
directors are assumed to be more vigilant, as they are
not under the direct influence of the CEO; as such,
they are more willing to make independent decisions and, if necessary, take action against management. However, as discussed previously, ample evidence suggests that CEOs exert major influence over
the process of new director selection (Westphal and
Zajac, 1995). Thus, independence alone may not prevent ingratiation between the CEO and directors.
In fact, some research suggests that the percentage
of directors who were appointed after the CEO began his or her tenure reflects an aspect of CEO power
(Takacs Haynes and Hillman, 2010). By extension,
boards with a greater percentage of outside directors who were appointed before the CEO assumed
position (i.e., “true outsiders”) have a lower potential for agency costs due to lower CEO influence
over the board, and are thus more effective at monitoring and controlling the CEO. As such, increasing shareholder power and influence to nominate future directors will be comparatively less beneficial to
shareholders of firms with a high proportion of true
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outsiders on the board—where a large proportion of
the board was elected before the CEO, the directors
are unlikely to feel indebted to the CEO for their positions. Therefore, firms with a higher percentage of
true outsiders on the board will experience smaller
changes in shareholder value in reaction to the proxy
access provision. Formally:
Hypothesis 3: The percent of true outsiders on the
board will be negatively related to the change in
shareholder value in reaction to the new rule.

CEO control, agency costs, and shareholder value
Ownership dispersion lies at the heart of the
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The
agency theory literature recognizes that shareholders
are not a uniform group, and there may be a divergence of interests among shareholders, in addition to
the divergence of interests between owners and managers. This is perhaps most prominent in the case of
shareholders who are also top managers and those
who are not. Certainly the majority trend is for firms
to issue equity compensation to top executives, which
creates a separate class of manager-owners, who can
use this granted status to exert their power over other
owners, and more directly, over corporate directors.
While firm equity is aimed to serve as an alignment
mechanism when managers make firm strategic decisions, “stock ownership can also be an important
source of power for the CEO” (Westphal and Zajac,
1995: 71). In the context of board nomination, it creates an unintended consequence of granting managers additional influence.
Consistent with this argument, CEO equity ownership has been proposed as an indicator of CEO power
(Finkelstein, 1992; Takacs Haynes and Hillman, 2010;
Weisbach, 1988), and recent research points to negative firm outcomes associated with high CEO ownership (Walters, Kroll, and Wright, 2008). In large
public corporations, even relatively low levels of
ownership can translate into significant influence (directly or indirectly) over firm decision making. CEOs
with relatively large equity stakes may have the necessary power to engage in behaviors that limit board
involvement and allow such CEOs to become entrenched in their executive position (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). As Fiegener
(2005: 634) notes, CEOs “holding larger ownership
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stakes may feel empowered” to protect their discretion over firm decisions from board interference.
Managers have a unique advantage over other owners, as they have access to private information and
are shielded by mechanisms that promote information asymmetry between themselves and other owners. Thus, if an owner is also a top manager, he or
she can use his or her ownership share to motivate
key decisions and keep board involvement at arm’s
length. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, firm ownership can create a secondary set of agency costs related to the additional power it grants the manager,
while preserving information asymmetry, resulting
in CEOs being better able to pursue their desires. This
effect is compounded by the fact that top managers
are routinely able to influence who monitors them.
As such, increasing owners’ power and influence in
director nomination should result in greater positive
change in shareholder value when CEO ownership
power is higher.6 Therefore:
Hypothesis 4: CEO ownership power will be positively related to the change in shareholder value in
reaction to the new rule.

Some environments and circumstances allow top
managers more discretion than others (Carpenter
and Golden, 1997). According to Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), managerial discretion has three distinct sources: industry and external environment
characteristics, organization characteristics, and the
executives’ personal characteristics. We restrict our
examination to the organizational characteristics
that serve as a source of discretion (i.e., firm-level
discretion), which can be defined as “the degree
to which the organization is amenable to an array of possible actions” (Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1990: 489). Shen and Cho (2005: 844) further refine
managerial discretion as the latitude of actions—
”the range of strategic options available to managers as they strive to bring about organizational
outcomes”—and the latitude of objectives, or the
freedom of managers to pursue personal goals. The
strategic management literature has predominantly
discussed and treated discretion from a neutral or
positive standpoint, which corresponds to the view

of discretion as the latitude of actions (e.g., Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995). In this view, higher
discretion simply provides managers greater range
of strategic options. However, the economics and
agency literatures conceptualize managerial discretion as the latitude of objectives (e.g., Williamson,
1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
According to agency theory assumptions, managerial discretion often leads to shirking and self-serving
behaviors on the part of managers to the detriment
of shareholders (Phillips et al., 2010). High discretion allows managers to pursue personal goals and
objectives with a low probability of getting caught
(Shen and Cho, 2005). As Finkelstein and Boyd (1998:
180n4) note, “agency theory perspective on managerial discretion focuses on the potential decision-making freedom of high discretion CEOs and implies that
such freedom will promote non-profit-maximizing
choices by the CEO.” Therefore, a CEO’s level of discretion can be viewed through an agency theory lens
as an indicator of agency costs—the higher the managerial discretion, the higher the potential for agency
costs; that is, the potential for self-interested behavior is higher when the CEO’s discretion is high. The
agency perspective suggests that when CEO discretion is higher, the presence of uncompromised and
vigilant monitors is especially important, as more
vigilant directors will be more likely to engage in
closer monitoring/control behaviors. Thus, we expect
the change in shareholder value to be greater when a
CEO has a high level of discretion.
Moreover, we do not expect this effect to be entirely linear or monotonic; specifically, we expect an
even higher market reaction for firms led by CEOs
with relatively high levels of discretion. This is because when CEO discretion reaches high levels, CEO
actions become less observable; as such, directors
may not be able to engage in effective oversight. If
this ability gets significantly impaired, the board may
be able to intervene only when inappropriate conduct
and managerial opportunism is uncovered. When
this occurs, the presence of monitors who act on behalf of shareholders and are willing to punish executives (e.g., through pay cuts or even termination from
the firm) is required. Research shows that boards are

6. If the incentive effect of equity ownership dominates the effect of increased CEO power, we would make the opposite prediction—that a less positive change in shareholder value will occur when CEO ownership is higher. While based on prior literature
we expect that the power effect will dominate in this context, our empirical tests will help to determine if this is, in fact, the case.
We thank a thoughtful reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
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generally unwilling to engage in the types of actions
that threaten managerial interests (e.g., Westphal
and Khanna, 2003), which is perhaps not surprising
given that the current director nomination process relies heavily on top management’s selection of director candidates. Thus, the ability to nominate monitors
to the board will be even more critical when the CEO
has a high level of discretion.
Hypothesis 5: CEO discretion will be positively related to the change in shareholder value in reaction
to the new rule, and even more so at high levels of
CEO discretion.

In addition to high CEO power and discretion,
other firm characteristics related to CEO control can
be indicative of higher potential agency costs, such
as the type of resources controlled. While the strategic management literature often highlights the positive results of resources (e.g., Sirmon, Gove, and
Hitt, 2008; Sirmon et al., 2010; Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007), governance scholars recognize that certain types of resources can create oversight problems,
resulting in increasing agency costs. For example,
Jensen (1986) highlights the agency costs of free cash
flow, which can allow managers to engage in gratuitous expansion of the firm referred to as “empire
building.” Agency theory also points to the downside
of high levels of intangible resources within a firm: as
the tangibility of the firm’s assets decreases, agency
costs increase (Bathala, Moon, and Rao, 1994; Gompers, 1995). Specifically, the less tangible the rent-generating resources, the higher the potential for agency
costs related to CEO opportunistic behavior: shirking and misappropriating company funds. Moreover,
firms with comparatively less tangible resources are
subject to greater information asymmetries (Harris
and Raviv, 1991). Due to these information asymmetries and the difficulty in finding appropriate benchmarks, CEOs of firms with higher levels of intangible
resources enjoy greater latitude for decision making,
which makes board monitoring more difficult. Because “intangible assets are harder to monitor and
easier to steal,” firms with relatively higher levels
of intangibles require stricter governance standards
(Durnev and Kim, 2005: 1474). As such, the potential for agency costs is higher as resource intangibility
increases, making shareholder power and influence
over director nomination and selection all the more
important. Therefore, we propose:
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Hypothesis 6: Resource intangibility will be positively related to the change in shareholder value in
reaction to the new rule.

Shareholder voice and bondholder value
Proponents of the director primacy model tend to
argue that granting shareholders greater influence
over the board will be detrimental to all other stakeholders’ interests. Greater shareholder voice through
proxy access may thus have important implications
for another key group of nonmanagement stakeholders—the firm’s bondholders. Similar to shareholders, bondholders are external stakeholders with a legal claim against the firm, making the two groups
similar “in kind.” As Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737)
note in their seminal review, “Corporate governance
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on
their investment.” Questions dealing with the value
of claims of shareholders and bondholders, the two
key suppliers of firms’ financial capital, are then central to corporate governance theory. Importantly, although shareholders and bondholders are similar “in
kind,” the two groups are fundamentally different in
their rights—stockholders have the right to residual
claims, but have the lowest priority in bankruptcy,
while bondholders only receive a fixed payment,
but have priority when the firm goes into default.
The tension these different rights create has often
been highlighted as shareholder-bondholder conflict
in the agency theory literature (e.g., Black and Cox,
1976; DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990; Fama and
Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani
and Miller, 1958; Subramaniam, 1998). In general, the
literature usually argues that—when given opportunity— each group will prefer actions that benefit
themselves, even at the cost of the other group’s welfare. For example, shareholders may opt for pursuing
risky projects because they share in the upside, while
creditors are forced to disproportionately bear the
costs of failure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This suggests that bondholders would be sensitive to regulatory changes that benefit the position of shareholders
vis-à-vis bondholders. However, if rule changes allow
some shareholders a tool to reign in management—
who are arguably the most powerful of stakeholders—bondholders are likely to react positively, as this
decreases management’s ability to extract firm value
at the expense of all other stakeholders.
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As Bebchuk (2003: 63) points out in reference to
the relative distribution of power, “there is no reason
to expect that reduced accountability to shareholders would translate into increased attention to stakeholders.” In fact, reduced accountability is likely to
lead to less attention paid by management to the concerns of non-management stakeholders. If, as we argue, the current governance system is compromised,
the distribution of claims between shareholders and
bondholders is not Pareto efficient; this means that
creating greater separation between the board and
management can reduce agency costs and be value
enhancing, thereby benefiting both share- and bondholders. Thus, balancing the influence of management by granting shareholders greater voice in the
director nomination process will be perceived favorably by creditors. Therefore:
Hypothesis 7: Granting shareholders greater influence in the process of director nomination will elicit
a positive bondholder reaction.

Methods
Sample and data
Our sampling frame is publicly traded firms from
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500. Consistent with event
study methodology, we eliminated firms that experienced other major events during the study period
(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Using Lexis-Nexis,
we identified firms with confounding events.7 Firms
with missing data were also excluded. The final sample consists of 392 firms.
Daily equity and bond returns, both for the sample
firms and additional firms that were used to construct
the market index (as explained below), were collected
from Datastream. Next, institutional ownership data
were collected from Thompson Financial’s Institutional Ownership database. Lastly, data reflecting the
firms’ governance characteristics were obtained from
Risk Metrics (formerly IRRC). Other firm-level variables were collected from Compustat.

Dependent variables
The market’s reaction to the new SEC proxy access rule (Hypothesis 1) and the change in shareholder value for each individual firm (remaining
hypotheses) serve as the dependent variables. The
change in shareholder value “is the unexpected percentage change in the stock price surrounding the
event, or the abnormal return” (Godfrey, Merrill,
and Hansen, 2009: 433) for each firm. The average
of all abnormal returns in the sample represents the
market reaction.
Abnormal returns enable investigators to isolate the impact of an event by controlling for the expected return. The expected return, by definition, is
the return that would be expected without the event.
However, because the SEC rule change impacts all
public firms in the United States, an expected return
cannot be calculated based on U.S. markets; instead,
we require a market index not be influenced by the
event. Following Zhang (2007), who studied the U.S.
market’s reaction to the passing of SOX, which also
affected the entire U.S. market, we use a market index of Canadian firms to calculate expected returns.
Because Canadian firms are not subject to the new
SEC rule, they should not react to the announcement
of the new rule; at the same time, they are influenced by a similar set of worldwide macroeconomic
conditions and are exposed to a substantial proportion of common economic news (e.g., Eun and Shim,
1989). Moreover, of all large stock markets, the Canadian market is the most closely related to the U.S.
market.8 As such, publicly traded Canadian firms
are utilized to calculate the expected return. Specifically, we calculate the market index as an equally
weighted portfolio of all Canadian firms with nonmissing returns in Datastream for both the estimation and event periods.
Next, we identify the appropriate “event window.” While a two-day window is commonly used
to address information leaking into the market, for
several reasons, a one-day event window is better suited for this research. First, the SEC neither

7. Specifically, we dropped firms that announced: dividends, repurchases, or earnings (seven firms), gaining or losing large contracts (five firms), merger and acquisition events (nine firms), newly issued patents (three firms), naming a new executive/ officer (six firms), or major legal issues (two firms).
8. The correlation has been estimated at 0.62, and the next highest correlation at 0.27, with the U.K. stock market (Roll, 1992). More
recently, Zhang (2007) reports a U.S.-Canadian return correlation of 0.78.
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approved nor announced the rule until 25 August
2010. Second, there was no widely held expectation
of the outcome of the vote in advance. Competing
arguments for and against the measure were well
known, and thus the outcome was uncertain. In fact,
the vote was tight (3–2 in favor), indicating a lack of
consensus on the part of the decision makers. In total then, the outcome was an exogenous event that
was not predictable before the announcement. Finally, because as the length of the announcement
window increases so does the noise-to-information ratio, a one-day event window is strongly recommended for use in event studies in corporate law
(Bhagat and Romano, 2002a). As such, we restrict
our event window to the day of the announcement,9
which reduces noise and potential bias, providing a
conservative yet accurate estimate of the market’s
reaction. Following convention, the return on firm
i’s share price on day t is calculated as:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit
where αi is the intercept term (reflecting the average return for the firm’s stock with no market movement; Godfrey et al., 2009), β measures the stock performance relative to the market, Rmt is the rate of
return on a market portfolio on day t , and εit is the
error term, or the abnormal return. Therefore, the abnormal return or change in shareholder value is represented by:
ARit = Rit − (αi + βiRmt )
where αi and βi are coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares regression of Rit on the market
model over the estimation period before the event;
using an approach similar to Godfrey et al. (2009), we
use the daily returns over the period beginning 130
days prior to the event, ending 10 days before the
event date. The abnormal return reflects the market’s
reaction to the announcement, adjusting for the predicted or “normal” return for that day.
To test the hypothesis regarding bondholder reac-
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tion, we gathered bond return data on our final sample of 392 firms; 330 firms had sufficient data to be included in the analysis. We then adjusted the returns
based on comparable bonds in the Canadian market.
Following Bessembinder et al. (2009), who focused on
measuring abnormal bond returns, we calculated abnormal bond returns using the returns to similarly
rated bonds as the benchmark. We adjusted the returns based on whether the firm has a rating of A or
above, or a BBB and below rating.10
Independent variables
Given that the new regulation provides some owners (i.e., with 3% or more ownership over three years)
the right to nominate directors, we include a count
variable of the total number of owners holding at least
three percent of the firm’s outstanding stock at the
end of 2009 (the previous calendar year). This represents the potential number of discrete share owners
who would receive the benefit of proxy access for the
purpose of director nomination. We proxy for the total number of these large shareholders using data on
institutional investor ownership.11
Next, two sets of variables were theorized to drive
the firm-level heterogeneity in the reaction to the announcement. These variables address: 1) the independence/effectiveness of the board, and 2) the costs associated with CEO control. First, we address factors
that are related to board characteristics. The “staggering” of boards, which limits the number of directors
up for election in any given year, is reflective of the
level of shareholder power over board structure and
director entrenchment. Governance scholars argue
that staggered boards allow managers to extract rents
and reduce shareholder value (e.g., Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2011). We
identify a staggered or classified board with a dummy
variable. Next, board independence is measured by
true outsider percentage, calculated as the ratio of outside directors appointed before the CEO assumed
the position to the total number of directors (Takacs
Haynes and Hillman, 2010).

9. The day after the event, unrelated negative information regarding the nation’s economic outlook was released; thus, we could
not investigate the momentum effect on the following day.
10. The results are substantively unchanged if we make the adjustments based on whether the firm has investment grade or speculative grade bonds.
11. We cannot identify all private individuals who own at least three percent but less than five percent, the level at which they
would be required to report as blockholders of the firm. This proxy thus offers a more conservative test of our hypotheses, as it
may only underestimate of the number of owners who benefit from the rule change.
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The second set of factors address CEO control,
which can affect agency costs, and specifically, the
portion of agency costs that arise due to CEO shirking or opportunism. As Godfrey and Hill (1995) discuss, agency costs are inherently “unobservable”;
thus, various attempts have been made to capture
these costs. For example, Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000)
measured agency costs as organizational expenses.
Instead of relying on such distal outcomes, we chose
more proximal proxies of the conditions that give
rise to agency costs. Agency theory proposes that
managers will pursue their own interests to the degree that they will be able to do so. This suggests
that high managerial power or discretion provides
the potential for agency costs. CEO ownership power
is measured as the percentage of the firm’s outstanding stock owned by the CEO (Finkelstein, 1992) at
the end of the firm’s 2009 fiscal year (last year available). We measure CEO discretion based on firm characteristics, using the firm’s capital intensity as a
proxy (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987), which can
be viewed as a firm-level indicator of the CEO’s task
environment (Boyd and Gove, 2006). Calculated as
the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to the
total number of employees at the end of the previous
year, it measures the lack of discretion, thus we multiply it by -1 to ease interpretation. Finally, because
intangible resources also grant managers more discretion, implying greater potential for agency costs,
we proxy for resource tangibility with estimates of
the tangibility of the particular firm’s resources, and
conduct robustness checks based on industry characteristics as discussed later. Following Surroca, Trib´o,
and Waddock (2010), resource intangibility is measured as the ratio of research and development expenses to the total number of employees.
Control variables
We include a number of control variables for the
firm’s governance characteristics, which might affect the market’s reaction to the new regulation. Duality, as a proxy for CEO power relative to the board
(e.g., Tuggle et al., 2010a; Takacs Haynes and Hillman,
2010), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is
also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. CEO ten-

ure, as a proxy for CEO entrenchment and control
over internal monitoring mechanisms (Berger, Ofek,
and Yermack, 1997), is measured as the number of
years the CEO has held the position at the firm at the
end of the firm’s 2009 fiscal year. Board size is the total number of directors on board, and is an important governance-related predictor of firm value (e.g.,
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008). We also control for
average director age, a proxy for general experience, and
average director tenure on the board (Tuggle, Schnatterly, and Johnson, 2010b), a proxy for directors’ firmspecific experience. Board percentage ownership is the
total percentage of the firm’s outstanding stock held
by board members (excluding the CEO), and controls
for board financial incentives. We include indicators
for whether the firm has a cumulative voting, secret ballot, special meeting, or written consent provision (Gompers et al., 2003), all of which can be indicative of the
level of shareholder power at the firm. Finally, we include variables that represent the current level of diversity on the board, which can affect board dynamics
(Westphal and Stern, 2007). Female director percentage
is the percentage of female directors on the board and
ethnic minority percentage is the percentage of directors
on the board listed as non-Caucasian.
Analysis
We utilize both nonparametric and parametric
methods to test our theory. First, to determine the
stock and bond market reaction to the new regulations, we perform a number of t-tests and alternative
nonparametric tests (as detailed below). We test the
remainder of our hypotheses using weighted least
squares regression, where observations with lower
error in the first stage (market model estimation) are
weighted more heavily in the analysis.12 We also use
robust standard errors to mitigate concerns about
heteroskedasticity.

Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Multicolinearity diagnostics showed that
the value inflation factor (VIF) was below 3.0 for all

12. The observations are weighted by the inverse of the standard deviations of the residuals from the market model. This provides
better estimates by adjusting for market model reliability and placing more weight in the analysis on observations that have
less noisy first-stage estimates. However, our conclusions are substantively unchanged if we perform standard ordinary least
squares regressions.
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Table 2. Tests for whether the stock abnormal return on the day of the event is greater than zero
Test name

Testing

Statistic

Significance

T-test for abnormal return

Mean AR >0

t= 14.860

Pr(T > t) = 0.000

Patell (1976) T-test for
standardized abnormal return

Mean SAR >0

Boehmer, Musumeci, and
Poulsen (1991) T-test for
standardized abnormal return

Mean SAR >0

t= 15.119

Pr(T > t) = 0.000

Wilcoxon signed-rank test

AR >0

z= 11.367

Prob > |z| = 0.000

Binomial Z statistic

Proportion of observed
positive ARs>0.50

k= 291 Observed
proportion = 0.74235

Pr(k >= 291) = 0.000

variables and mean VIF was below 1.5 for all regression models, which suggests no multicolinearity
issues.
Hypothesis 1a predicted that giving owners
greater power over director nomination will elicit a
positive market reaction. Table 2 presents five alternative tests of this hypothesis—three parametric
tests and two nonparametric tests. The t-test for the
market’s reaction indicates that the return is significantly greater than zero, supporting Hypothesis 1a.
This conclusion is unchanged if we use: 1) standardized abnormal returns, and 2) a test which accounts
for the first-stage error (Patell, 1976; Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991), 3) a Wilcoxon signed rank
test, which accounts for both the sign and the magnitude of abnormal returns, or 4) the binomial Z-statistic, which indicates that 291 out of 392 individual returns were positive (74.2% compared to the expected
proportion of 50%). Moreover, the economic magnitude of the reaction is also consequential—the mean
abnormal return is 0.83%, or 83 basis points. For comparison, the average daily return on the S&P 500 in
2010 was 5 basis points, or 0.05%, per day. Thus, the
return in our study over a single day is over 16 times
greater than the average daily return that year. Additionally, studies in finance have shown returns from a
well-documented trading strategy, momentum trading, to be about 100 basis points (or 1%) per month
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002). As illustrated, the reaction we detect is economically large.
Model 1 in Table 3 shows regression results with
only the control variables. Model 2 in Table 3 includes our independent variables. Hypothesis 1b predicted that the number of owners receiving influence
over director nomination will be positively related to
the change in shareholder value. The coefficient on

t= 8.195

Pr(T > t) = 0.000

Table 3. Regression models of firm-specific predictors on the
abnormal return
Model 1:
Control

Model 2:
full model

Constant
0.031∗
Duality
−0.001
CEO tenure
0.000
Board size
0.000
Average director age
−0.000+
Average director tenure −0.000
Board % ownership
0.010
Cumulative voting
−0.004+
Secret ballot
−0.000
Special meeting
0.000
Written consent
0.001
Female director %
0.018∗
Ethnic minority %
−0.015∗
Number of owners
Classified board 		
True outsider % 		
CEO ownership power 		
Low discretion 		
High discretion 		
Resource intangibility 		
F
2.53∗∗
R2
0.07
Adj. R2
0.04
N
392

0.025+
−0.000
−0.000
0.000
−0.000
−0.000
0.005
−0.003
−0.000
0.001
0.001
0.018∗
−0.011+
0.001∗
0.002∗
−0.007∗
0.087∗∗
0.001∗
0.226∗∗
0.041∗∗
3.77∗∗∗
0.16
0.12
392

+ p < 0.10 ; ∗ p < 0.05 ; ∗∗ p < 0.01 ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

the number of institutional owners holding three percent or more of the firm’s stock in Model 2 is positive
and statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis
1b. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1a and
supports the idea that the positive market reaction is
driven by the increase in shareholder power over director nomination.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the use of a classified
or “staggered” board will be positively related to the
change in shareholder value in reaction to the new
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rule. The coefficient on the classified board indicator
in Model 2 is positive and marginally significant, offering marginal support for Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the proportion of true
outsiders on the board will be negatively related to
the change in shareholder value. The coefficient on
the true outsider percentage in Model 2 is negative
and statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that CEO ownership
power will be positively related to the change in
shareholder value in reaction to the new rule. The coefficient on CEO ownership power in Model 2 of Table 3 is positive and statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that CEO discretion will
be positively related to the change in shareholder
value in reaction to the new rule, and even more so
at high levels of discretion. Following prior research
(e.g., Greve, 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009), we utilize a
spline function to test this hypothesis. A spline function is appropriate when testing hypotheses that suggest a continuous relationship that changes slope at a
critical threshold, referred to as a “knot.” Instead of
dividing the sample and modeling various subsamples individually, which would disrupt the continuity of the function, or forcing a continuous and symmetric solution (as a curvilinear term renders), spline
functions allow for more accurate modeling of nonlinear relationships where the slope changes at a certain value for one of the variables. In the absence of a
prespecified theoretical threshold of what value constitutes high firm-level discretion based on the firm’s
capital intensity, we follow Fiss (2011) in setting the
knot at the seventy-fifth percentile in our sample,13
which represents a high level of discretion. Thus, the
spline function creates two variables from the single
continuous variable—low discretion (modeling the relationship below the seventy-fifth percentile), and
high discretion (the relationship above the seventyfifth percentile).
The coefficient on low discretion in Model 2 is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient
on high discretion is also positive and statistically significant; moreover, the coefficient on high discretion

1445

is significantly larger compared to the low discretion
coefficient (p < 0.05). This shows evidence of a positive linear relationship, with an increase in the impact
of discretion at high levels of firm discretion, providing strong support for Hypothesis 5.14
Hypothesis 6 predicted that resource intangibility
will be positively related to the change in shareholder
value in reaction to the new rule. The resource intangibility coefficient in Model 2 of Table 3 is positive
and significant, offering support for Hypothesis 6.
Finally, Hypothesis 7 predicted that giving shareholders greater power over director nomination will
elicit a positive bondholder reaction. The three tests
presented in Table 4 indicate strong statistical support
for this hypothesis. The results show that, contrary to
the zero-sum game prediction, bondholders perceive
the shareholder proxy access rule to also create value
for creditors and react positively, albeit the economic
magnitude of the positive reaction is smaller compared to the stock market’s reaction (44 basis points).
This is an expected outcome, given that the benefit of
the new rule to bondholders is less direct compared
with the benefit it provides to shareholders.
Robustness checks and additional analysis
We performed a number of additional analyses
to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we performed all analyses using a global baseline for calculating abnormal returns, created from all non- U.S.
stocks with available data in Compustat’s Global database, in lieu of the Canadian baseline. All of our results
were substantively unchanged from those reported.
Second, we used alternative measures of CEO discretion (used to test Hypothesis 5). We first considered a measure based on sales growth. Because our
argument is based on discretion at the firm level, we
used the firm’s industry-adjusted sales growth over
the previous five years as a proxy for discretion (Boyd,
1990; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998); this approach takes
into account both firm-level and industry-related variance (Boyd and Gove, 2006). Managers at firms with
relatively high growth would be expected to have
greater discretion, and thus shareholders at such

13. Our conclusions remain unchanged if we set the fiftieth percentile in our sample as the knot, and are robust to a number of
other specifications between the fiftieth and eightieth percentiles.
14. If we model the change in the impact of discretion as a ‘change-in-intercept’ as opposed to ‘change-in-slope,’ using the full
range of the continuous variable and an indicator variable for levels above the seventy-fifth percentile, the results and conclusions remain unchanged.
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Table 4. Tests for whether the bond abnormal return on the day of the event is greater than zero
Test name

Testing

Statistic

		

T-test for abnormal return
Wilcoxon signed-rank test
Binomial Z statistic (N = 330)

Mean AR >0
AR >0
Proportion of observed
positive ARs>0.50

t= 6.540 		
z= 5.819 		
k= 208 Observed 		
proportion = 0.63030

Significance
Pr(T > t) = 0.000
Prob > |z| = 0.000
Pr(k >=208) = 0.000

The Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991) t-test are not available for bond abnormal returns because they require regression
residuals in order to be calculated, and the proper method for calculating bond abnormal returns is not a regression-based technique
(please see Bessembinder et al., 2009).

firms would benefit more from the announcement of
the new rule. Our results using this alternate measure continue to provide strong support for Hypothesis 5. Secondly, we used the firm’s free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) as a measure of the value that the manager
would have the ability to extract from the firm. Results using this measure again provide general support for our hypothesis. We find that discretion continues to have a significant impact on the change in
shareholder value when discretion is high.15
Third, we used an alternative measure of firm resource intangibility (Hypothesis 6), based on the nature of the firm’s primary industry. Firms in service
industries create value mainly from intangible resources, such as knowledge (Williams, 2007) and human capital (Hitt et al., 2001). We created a service
industry indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s primary industry is classified as service industry based
on the 48 industry Fama-French classification (Fama
and French, 1997), and 0 otherwise. This classification of service industries is largely based on the classification used by the U.S. Department of Labor and
the U.S. Census Bureau (SIC codes with prefix 70–89,
based on the 1987 SIC Manual), with three additional
industries: commercial printing, advertising specialty, and warehousing/storage. The findings show
that firms in industries with less tangible resources
do indeed experience significantly greater change in
shareholder value (the coefficient on the service industry dummy variable is positive and highly significant), providing further support for Hypothesis 6.
Finally, we investigated whether the relationship between CEO ownership and the change in shareholder
value is in fact nonlinear, because our theory suggests

that the relationship could be driven primarily by
high levels of CEO equity that provide the CEO with
powerful leverage. We used a spline function to let
the coefficient vary above and below the seventy-fifth
percentile ownership, and the results suggest that the
relationship is indeed stronger (i.e., the coefficient is
larger and statistically significant) at high equity levels; all of our other conclusions are unaltered if we
model CEO ownership in this fashion. Also, the results remain substantively unchanged if we set the
threshold at the seventieth or eightieth percentile.

Discussion
This study examines the complex relationships between the corporation’s stakeholders from an agency
theory perspective. Drawing from an ongoing debate
among legal scholars that juxtaposes two perspectives related to who the board “works for,” we examine the effects of giving shareholders greater influence in the nomination of directors. We provide
answers to the following questions: Does such power
create value? If so, what is this value creation contingent upon? Finally, does such power benefit other
stakeholders? We utilize the SEC’s announcement of
a new proxy access rule as a natural experiment to
answer these questions. More specifically, we investigated the market’s reaction to the SEC’s announcement of the new rule, which grants large, long-term
shareholders greater rights in the process of director
nomination. Under the new rule, shareholders owning at least three percent of the firm’s traded stock
for three consecutive years will be able to nominate

15. Small amounts of free cash might help the firm to maintain enough liquidity for opportunities requiring immediate investment, but are more easily monitored by shareholders. On the other hand, high amounts of free cash would likely be unnecessary to maintain reasonable liquidity and would be more difficult to monitor, leading to higher potential agency costs, which
should lead to greater positive shareholder reaction to the new rule.
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at least one new director candidate (and up to 25%
of the board size) per election. Following our theory,
the results show that regulatory oversight that balances out the power between shareholders and management with respect to affecting board composition plays an influential role in increasing firm value.
Our results show that the market reacted in a significant and positive manner to the passage of this new
rule, and that the magnitude of the reaction was positively related to the number of owners who would
be eligible to benefit from the new rule. The reaction was not only statistically significant but also economically significant. Thus, the first contribution of
this study is showing that additional value is created
when owners are granted greater voice in the firm’s
governance, and thus supporting the argument put
forth by “shareholder democracy” advocates that
shareholder voice helps reduce agency losses (e.g.,
Bebchuk, 2005; 2006).
Importantly, beyond investigating the primary effect, we presented theory and evidence explicating
when shareholder voice is most critical. By examining two sets of factors that help explain the magnitude of change in shareholder value, we contribute
to our understanding of how agency conflicts between owners, directors, and managers reduce firm
value. First, we focused on factors that signify weak
governance; specifically, certain characteristics of the
board. As hypothesized, the change in shareholder
value was more positive for firms with less independent boards, indicated by factors such as a staggered board structure and a low proportion of true
outsider directors. Second, we investigated factors
related to the CEO control, which can affect agency
costs, and specifically agency costs due to CEO
shirking or opportunism. Here, we again find support that the change in shareholder value is greater
for firms with higher levels of potential agency costs
due to greater CEO control. We show that the ability of owners to nominate directors is more critical
when the CEO is a powerful owner, has higher levels of discretion, and the firm possesses greater levels of intangible resources, as these are conditions
that lead to increased potential for top managers to
pursue their own agendas and extract private benefits at the expense of shareholders. As such, a second
contribution of this study is identifying firm-specific
factors that are detrimental to firm value in the absence of effective board oversight.
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Lastly, we investigated whether providing shareholders greater voice in director nomination appears
to be value increasing or value reducing to another
key stakeholder group—the firm’s creditors. Director
primacy advocates often argue that granting shareholders greater influence in the firm’s governance will
be to the detriment of all other stakeholder groups.
Contrary to this position though, and in further support of shareholder primacy advocates’ arguments
(e.g., Bebchuk, 2003; 2005), we find that reducing management’s singular influence over board composition benefits both shareholders and bondholders, supporting the idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend.” Overly powerful management is perceived as
value destroying by both groups, despite their differences. As such, this study contributes to the decadesold debate on the shareholder-bondholder conflict by
illuminating conditions under which the interests of
these two very different groups are aligned.
In total, then, we show that greater shareholder
voice in matters of board nomination increases market value, especially where ownership structures allow multiple shareholders to benefit from proxy
access, where boards are currently aligned with
managers rather than shareholders, and where firm
characteristics imply a high degree of managerial
control. However, extreme positions on proxy access by shareholders could undermine this apparent
benefit. For example, the positive results we found
were based on a proxy rule that could be construed
as “balancing” the concerns of both the shareholder
and director primacy perspectives, in that access
was provided to heavily vested, long-term shareholders (3% ownership for three years). On the other
hand, if access is eased via requirements of lower
ownership and/or a shorter holding period, the results may lead to negative outcomes, as short-term
owners could manipulate the firm for their direct
benefit. This is suggested by the findings of Larcker
et al. (2011), who show that a proposed version of a
proxy rule related to as little as one percent ownership for one year negatively affected value creation.
It seems that the concerns of both perspectives—too
much shareholder power over the board is bad per
the director primacy view and too little or no control is bad per the shareholder perspective—are
valid. Thus the last contribution of our study is the
integration of corporate law literature into strategic management research, which can lead to a better
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understanding of how governance impacts firm performance and firm value.
This study is also unique in its design, which
uses an event study in the context of a natural experiment—an external event that was not under the
firms’ control. Employing event study methodology
in these types of settings—new rules, laws, and regulations—allows for powerful inferences as it eliminates the threat of endogeneity, commonly present
in strategic management research. As such, natural
experiments present a great opportunity to test theories, such as agency theory, which have received
mixed support in prior work.
Limitations and future research
Given that we test our hypotheses using a natural experiment—an exogenous shock, which impacts
the population of publicly traded firms—the validity
of our findings is high. However, given that we limit
our investigation to a sample of large (S&P 500) firms,
future studies should test whether the results hold in
a wider sample of firms. Furthermore, future research
can examine the impact of industry context on the
market’s reaction to greater proxy access. For example, was the reaction more positive in highly dynamic
industries where firms may benefit from a greater diversity of director background and experience? Conversely, was the reaction smaller in highly munificent
industries? It is also possible that greater power in
the process of director nomination, and hence greater
control over the board, may be more important to
shareholders of firms in regulated or controversial
(e.g., polluting) industries.
We limited our investigation of firm characteristics to agency problem-related issues. An interesting extension may explore how previous firm strategy affects shareholder reaction to greater director
nomination access. For example, does high merger
and acquisition activity lead to greater shareholder
appreciation of proxy access? Also, how does stakeholder strategy affect it? Some firms (and, by extension, corporate boards) put much greater emphasis
on broader stakeholder issues; it could be interesting
to examine how these efforts are differentially valued by different stakeholder groups, such as shareholders and bondholders. Moreover, future research
should further investigate not only whose interests

the board usually represents, providing important
insights to the largely normative corporate law debate, but also when director attention shifts from one
group to the other (shareholder to stakeholder issues, and vice versa).
Our results suggest that greater shareholder voice,
when it acts to reign in managerial power and help
prevent opportunism, may in fact be beneficial to
other stakeholder groups. While our study limits the
analysis to bondholders, future research can investigate whether greater shareholder voice translates to
positive outcomes for additional stakeholders. It is
possible that firms where shareholders yield substantial influence, sometimes referred to as “democracies,” also tend to invest in other stakeholder-focused
initiatives and exhibit high corporate social performance. On the other hand, it may be that too much
shareholder power sways the focus on shareholderonly benefits, especially in the case of powerful shortterm owners, as research suggests that stakeholder
management is likely to pay off in the long run.
Implications for practice
While strongly grounded in extant theory, this
study is, by its natural experiment design, closely
tied to its empirical context. We examined the market’s reaction to a specific event—the initial passing
of the new SEC proxy access (director nomination)
rule on 25 August 2010. This new rule has stirred up
substantial controversy. Indeed, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and Business Roundtable almost immediately brought a lawsuit in the federal appeals court in
the District of Columbia (i.e., D.C. Circuit) against the
SEC to challenge this rule. To represent them in their
fight against the SEC, and perhaps to signal their seriousness about it, these groups hired a prominent
Washington D.C. attorney, Eugene Scalia.16
On 22 July 2011, it became apparent that the
group’s efforts were successful, with the D.C. Circuit overturning the SEC’s adoption of the proxy access rule as “arbitrary,” “capricious,” and an “abuse
of discretion” (Business Roundtable and Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 2011: 6). In its opinion, the D.C.
Circuit explicitly adopted an “anti-Bebchuk” view of
extant legal scholarship, going to the extent of explicitly quoting from and citing a 2006 law review article, which directly attacked Bebchuk (Strine, 2006;

16. Scalia is the son of U.S. Supreme Court Justice and former D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia.
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Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, 2011: 14–15). In addition, the D.C. Circuit chided
the SEC for not fully analyzing the costs and benefits
of the rule, and in particular for not doing sufficient
“economic analysis” with regard to the purported
“shareholder value creation” related to the rule. The
federal appeals court stated that it felt that the SEC
“relied upon insufficient empirical data when it concluded that the proxy access rule (14a–11) will improve board performance and increase shareholder
value” (Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 2011: 11).
On 6 September 2011, SEC Chair Mary L. Schapiro issued a statement that said that the SEC had decided, for now, not to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s decision. She did, however, reiterate her support for the
proxy access rule, simply noting that the SEC wanted
to “carefully consider and learn” from the D.C. Circuit’s objections before the agency determined “the
best path forward.” She then ordered the SEC staff to
conduct a careful review of the issue (SEC, 2011).
In this context, our study seems unusually timely.
In providing clear empirical evidence with respect to
shareholder value creation and the SEC’s proxy access rule, we provide direct assistance to policy makers as they respond to the federal appeals court’s
objections to the rule. Importantly, we show that
the rule appears to benefit another key stakeholder
group, firm bondholders, addressing the objections of
some its opponents. As such, we help to empirically
inform the discourse on the role of public policy in
corporate law (Bhagat and Romano, 2002b).
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